this decision, the Court had consistently interpreted the doctrine of federal reserved water rights expansively, recognizing and granting all rights claimed by the United States. 10 Specifically, the Court held that the United States, in reserving the Gila National Forest from the public lands, had reserved only enough water to accomplish the purposes for which the land was originally withdrawn. 1 These purposes were "to preserve the timber [and] to secure favorable water flows for private and public uses under state law. ' 1 12 Although the Forest Service is authorized under subsequent legislation to use National Forest lands in other ways, s such secondary purposes do not have a reserved water right.
14 To acquire water for secondary purposes, the Forest Service must apply to the states pursuant to their laws. 5 Western states viewed this decision as significantly increasing state control of "their" 1 " water. Recognition of the federal claims for reserved rights predicated on secondary purposes, it was thought, would have threatened the displacement of private rights held under state law. 18 Academic commentators, on the other hand, generally were critical of the Court's construction of the acts under which National Forests are created. 19 Several, like the dissent, 2 0 dismissed as mere dictum the Court's statement that the sole exception to state control of western water is the federal reserved right. 1 More significantly, the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior reacted to the New Mexico decision by asserting the existence of a federal nonreserved water right. 2 2 The Solicitor's Opinion maintains that this right "arises from actual use of unappropriated water by the United States to carry out congressionallyauthorized management objectives on federal lands. 2 3 In the exercise of this right, compliance with state law, although desirable, is not required. 4 Proponents of complete state control of water rights objected strenuously to the Solicitor's Opinion. The Western States Water Council 25 and the General Counsel of the New Mexico Water Resources Division 26 criticized it as an attempt to circumvent the holding in United States v. New Mexico and revive the claim to a federal water right independent of state law. In response to this opposition, the Secretary of the Interior promised governors of western states that the relevant portions of the Solicitor's Opinion would be, in effect, set aside. 2 He also directed his subordinates to Rights, 51 COLO. L. REv. 209 (1980 
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The University of Chicago Law Review [48:758 assert "no blanket, across the board claims for non-reserved rights." 2 For the time being, the nonreserved federal right argument is to be held in abeyance. 2 9 This comment argues that the theory of a nonreserved right to appropriate water for secondary federal land management objectives is unsound and poses a serious threat to the rights of states and private individuals. 30 Every proprietor of lands on the banks of a river has naturally an equal right to the use of water which flows in the stream adjacent to his lands, as it was wont to run, (currere solebat) without diminution or alteration. No proprietor above or below him has a right to use the water to the prejudice of other proprietors unless he has a prior right to divert it, or a title to some exclusive enjoyment. He has no property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes along. Aqua currit et debet currere, is the language of the law. Though he may use the water while it runs over his land, he cannot unreasonably detain it, or give it another direction, and he must return it to its ordinary channel when it leaves his estate. 36 174 U.S. 690, 702 (1899) (dictum). served right rely on the same Rio Grande dictum. 3 8 That reliance is misplaced.
A. The Rio Grande Dictum
The dictum assumes as a settled rule of the common law that riparian ownership carries an attendant right to flowing waters. 3 9 at common law was riparian land tenure. It then acknowledged that a state or a territory could "change [the] common law rule and permit the appropriation of the flowing waters." Id. at 703.
The Court posited two exceptions, however, to the states' freedom to adopt an appropriation system. States could not limit the federal government's preexisting riparian rights or the navigability of navigable streams without specific authority from Congress. Therefore, so the proponents' argument goes, the federal government acquired riparian rights in territorial streams, rivers, and ground waters and has retained this proprietary interest in all waters appropriated under state law. 40 Because of the supremacy clause, the states formed from those territories cannot extinguish those rights. 4 1 This argument postulates that the federal government acquires rights under the common law, that is, state law, 42 but denies that state law can determine the existence and extent of those rights. This amounts to saying that when the national government acquires state-created water rights, they somehow become greater than they were originally. The argument that the federal government holds state-created rights, but that the states cannot define these rights, is plainly inconsistent. It also contradicts the general rule that a transferee obtains a right no greater than that possessed by the transferor. 3 Second, the proponents' argument depends on the assumption that a state can create riparian rights in real property situated beyond its physical borders." This assumption is necessary because One qualification is appropriate here. There are two distinct theories of western water rights, the "California" and "Colorado" doctrines. The former holds sway in California, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington; the latter rules in Colorado, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. 5 R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 400, at 7 & nn.21-22. Under the California doctrine, the federal government has an original property right in all the nonnavigable waters of the states formed from territories acquired by the United States. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 336-43, 10 P. 674, 720-24 (1886); 1 S. WmL, supra note 39, § § 152-153 . States that have adopted the California doctrine recognize appropriative and riparian rights, both of which derive from the original federal title. Id. § § 155-156. Thus, to the extent that the courts of these states apply the doctrine, there is a common law foundation for the federal riparian rights.
In Colorado-doctrine states, on the other hand, the United States never acquired title to western waters. 2 C. KnEY Cal. 255, 337, 10 P. 674, 720, (1886), it did not include water rights that attached to all riparian lands within the state. Riparianism was only one alternative a court could employ. Appropriation, if anything, was the common law rule. See note 39 supra. Adoption of the common law only means that the state or territory adopts "a general system as against Finally, riparian rights are not as broad as the federal reserved right, and the reserved right has never been limited according to riparian definitions. 47 Unless the lesser (riparian rights) can include the greater (federal reserved rights), common law riparianism is an inadequate basis for the federal reserved right, much less the nonreserved right.
The Rio Grande passage would be correct if it were limited to a situation where a state, having previously recognized riparian rights, attempted to deny them upon switching to an appropriation system. 48 The federal government could then raise the supremacy clause, which prohibits state destruction of federal property rights. 49 However, this is very different from the argument of the Rio Grande dictum that a state may not, from the beginning, institute an appropriation system that would "destroy" federal riparian rights within the state.
These logical problems involved in a claim of a federal riparian right may not, in themselves, constitute sufficient reason to reject the claim, but they do identify inconsistencies within the theory. These inconsistencies are the result of a problem in the internal structure of the theory.
B. The Federal Right and the Common Law
Analysis of the assertion of a federal riparian right in western waters under the common law reveals a fundamental flaw. The another general system," not that "patentees of a ranch on the San Pedro are to have the same rights as owners of an estate on the Thames. 
1981]
The
That case was decided during the era of the general federal common law. 0 Until the early twentieth century, the federal judiciary presupposed the existence of a common law independent of the courts that applied it. Courts found their rules of decision; they did not create them. 5 51 As dissatisfaction with this view of the common law grew, judges occasionally mocked the notion of an immutable common law. "The Common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identi- 1, 62 (1890) . The reception was limited, however. Where they were found to be inappropriate for local conditions of a state or territory, common law rules were rejected. See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. 17, § 1 (1910) (common law riparian doctrine of no force or effect).
The original source of western water law was the custom and practice of the pioneers. State common law does not support a federal riparian title; indeed, it is in cases where state law does not give the federal agencies as much as they want that they make the riparian argument. 5 5 The riparian claim is not based on state law but is made in spite of it.
The only remaining source of law that might support the nonreserved right is the modern federal common law."' Principles of this "special" federal common law, examined below, 57 dictate that no federal nonreserved right can exist until Congress acts.
C. The Reserved Right
Even if a residual 8 federal water right exists, "9 it is nothing more than the reserved right. 6 0 The reserved right exhausts the federal riparian right because it is the sole exception to the longstanding deference that Congress has paid to state control of western waters. The Supreme Court has said that this right is to be narrowly construed to give effect to the congressional policy. Beck, 133 U.S. 541 (1890) (riparian rights attach to public lands only on conveyance to private owner and according to state law).
55 Where water is available for federal projects under state law, federal agencies are happy to proceed under it unless a reserved right is available. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 578; letter to Cecil Andrus, supra note 29.
be "The rights and duties of the United States... are governed by federal rather than by local law.... In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards. 57 See text and notes at notes 82-99 infra. 58 The "residual" right is that which remains of the original federal title under the California doctrine, see note 46 supra, and which purportedly underlies both the reserved and nonreserved federal rights, see Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 563. right is identical with the federal riparian right. 6 3 The nonreserved federal right theory is an attempt to reopen the question of the scope of the reserved right under a new rubric." Recognition of the nonreserved right would frustrate the congressional policy to limit the federal exception to state control. By identifying the Rio Grande riparian right with the reserved right in California v. United States, the Court rejected the implication of a riparian nonreserved right. In sum, the argument that Rio Grande supports a nonreserved right expands the reserved right beyond the limit set for it by the Supreme Court. It relies on an assertion of federal title premised on a discredited nineteenth-century notion of common law. If a federal right does exist in nonreserved and unappropriated waters, it is not the result of the United States's having "title" to the waters. One must look elsewhere, namely, to the power of Congress to create property rights for the United States.
III. CONGRESSIONAL POWER AND FEDERAL APPROPRIATION OF WATER

A. The Concept of Ownership
Although the federal government has no proprietary right in nonreserved and unappropriated western waters, Congress can create such a right. 6 5 The power to do so is ancient, simple, and basic.
For over two thousand years the Western legal world has included water in the "negative community" of property common to all but owned by none until reduced to possession. 6 When the thing is not possessed, it is not owned.
6 7 The classic example of a member of the negative community is the wild animal." 8 The fun- Neither "owns" unappropriated water, 78 but each has the power to use it and to regulate its use. In light of this view of government ownership, it is not important whether the federal government "owns" water in western states. The federal government can obtain traditional ownership of water by appropriating it. The important question is whether state or federal rules of capture apply to the United States. In other words, the issue is whether Congress has established a federal regulatory jurisdiction over federal appropriations, or has recognized the inherent regulatory jurisdiction of the states and adapted federal programs to it.
B. Federal Common Law and State Regulation of Federal Appropriation
Congress has not enacted a general statute regulating federal acquisition of appropriative water rights,7 9 although the idea has been suggested several times. 8 0 Instead, Congress has recognized and deferred to state control of western waters. 81 76 441 U.S. at 335-36. 7 Id. at 335.
78 "A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds or animals. Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to possession by skillful capture." Nevertheless, the question remains whether the water systems of the western states are to be displaced by a federal appropriative rule whenever a federal agency believes that the state system limits its ability to accomplish secondary management objectives mandated by Congress. Because Congress has not explicitly decided whether federal agencies must obey the laws of the states in appropriating water for secondary management purposes, but federal rights are involved, the issue is one of the modern federal common law. 82 The power to formulate a federal rule of decision may flow Court supported this proposition with a citation to a Senate document listing 37 statutes "in which Congress has expressly recognized the importance of deferring to state water law." Id. at 702 n. Most of the statutes the note cites provide authorization or funding for the acquisition of state rights for federal purposes. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § § 4601-9(a)(1), -10a, -10b (1976) (for recreational inholdings); id. § § 460bb-2(a), 541(e) (for Suislaw National Forest by donation, purchase, exchange, or otherwise); id. § § 541(d), 690 (for Bear River Migrating Bird Refuge by purchase, lease, or gift). The repeated enumerations of specific methods of acquisition make no sense unless predicated on state rights: if the rights were federal, the federal government would already own them.
Of the entire list cited in the note, only one statute plausibly mandates federal administration of western water, id. § la-2(e). None explicitly authorizes a federal agency to preempt state water administration; none faces the issue. Most contemplate federal acquisition of state law rights. See also Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 578. In sum, the statutes do not support the claim that Congress has, on at least 25 occasions, chosen not to defer to state law.
The note also scrutinized the 37 statutes to which the Court adverted in from the fact that the rights and duties of the United States are in question. 5 The federal common law may incorporate state law. 86 Federal common law rules are invoked only when a substantial federal interest is at stake." It is not enough that Congress could regulate federal water appropriations; there must be a significant conflict between state law and federal policy. 8 . This is distinct from the rule forbidding the states from discriminating against the federal government. For example, the Solicitor attempts to rely on United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973), in arguing for the inapplicability of state law to federal appropriation. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 574-77. In that case, however, the state law was specifically hostile to federal interests, 412 U.S. at 595, and the federal program did not require uniformity, see id. at 607 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
91 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
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Federal Nonreserved Water Rights
The Solicitor argues that uniform management of federal lands is an important federal policy that justifies a general federal rule establishing the nonreserved right. 92 The recent case of Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 9 a boundary dispute between Indians and non-Indians, undercuts his argument. The Court approved, as the federal rule of decision, the application of state law rules of accretion and avulsion 9 ' to determine the location of the Indian reservation's border.
9 5 Because this decision had the effect of shrinking the reservation, the Indians objected to the application of state law, arguing that federal boundary cases should provide the rule of decision.
The Court found no need for a uniform federal rule because "'generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting state law would adversely affect [federal interests]'" are insufficient reasons for rejecting state law. e The Court noted that no unfairness to the United States would result: the jurisdiction of federal courts is sufficient to ensure equity and evenhandedness in application of state law to federal rights. 7 The Court also recognized the strong state interest in having its law apply to protect "the reasonable expectations of. .. private land owners upset by the vagaries of being located adjacent to . . . property in which the United States has a substantial interest." ' s Finding that a federal rule threatened to harm existing private relationships based on state law, and that no frustration of federal policy or functions required a nationally uniform rule, the Court decided that state law should be incorporated. 99 In light of this decision, the Solicitor's assertion of a federal appropriative right for congressionally authorized purposes 0 0 lacks merit. He merely makes a general plea for uniformity of federal land management programs; 101 he does not attempt to present evi-:2 Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 7, at 576-77. '3 442 U.S. 653 (1979). " Avulsion is the abrupt change in a river course in which property boundaries marked by the river do not change. Accretion is the gradual change in a river course, in which case the property line moves with the river. See id. at 660 n. For example, uniformity is not essential to the National Forest management program. It could, in fact, be damaging to the program. "One of the basic concepts of multiple use is that all of these resources are entitled to equal consideration, but in particularized or localized areas, relative values of the various resources are to be recognized." 117 The Secretary of Agriculture must give "due consideration to the relative values of various resources in particular areas." 1 8 He also must "provide for public participation in the development, review, and revision of land management plans.""' 1 His approach to land management must be "systematic" and "interdisciplinary,' ' 20 but nowhere is he charged with the duty of achieving uniformity of forest management. This is not surprising; the policy behind the multiple uses that the Secretary must achieve 1 21 demands that periodic adjtistments in use be made "to conform to changing needs and conditions" 22 and that "some land will be used for less than all of the resources.' 23 Uniformity simply is not important to the program.' Thus, neither public lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management nor National Forest System lands require uniform management. Because Congress either has adapted its programs to state law or has designed them to allow for variations in management according to local conditions, lack of uniformity will not frustrate any specific federal objectives. 
